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“RECONCILING RIGHTS”
THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA’S APPROACH
TO COMPETING CHARTER
RIGHTS
The Honourable Justice Frank Iacobucci*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 became part of Canada’s constitution
by virtue of the Constitution Act, 1982, assuming the role of pre-eminent textual guardian of our fundamental freedoms. Over the last 20 years, Canadian
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have defined the contours of individual
Charter rights, and sought to establish a framework for when state action could
legitimately encroach upon constitutionally protected rights. One area of Charter jurisprudence which remains relatively undeveloped, however, is that which
concerns competing Charter rights. While much has been written on the limits
of an individual’s Charter rights vis-à-vis the state, the same cannot be said
about the parameters of one individual’s Charter rights vis-à-vis those of another. In other words, how should we deal with the situation where Charter
rights conflict? The answer, in my view, is to be found in the concept of reconciling Charter rights, a topic that is the subject of this paper.
It is important to recognize that the techniques required for reconciling Charter rights are analogous to those used in various other areas of constitutional
analysis, and indeed, legal analysis more generally. To illustrate, in Reference
re Secession of Quebec,2 the Supreme Court considered the relationship among

* Justice, Supreme Court of Canada. I should like to recognize the invaluable assistance of
my law clerk, Tanya Monestier, in the research and preparation of these comments.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
2
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
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four foundational constitutional principles: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism/rule of law and respect for minority rights. The Court stated:
These defining principles function in symbiosis. No single principle can be defined
in isolation from the others, nor does any one principle trump or exclude the operation of any other.
Our Constitution has an internal architecture, or what the majority of this Court
... [has] called a ‘basic constitutional structure.’ The individual elements of the
Constitution are linked to the others, and must be interpreted by reference to the
structure of the Constitution as a whole.3 (emphasis added).

Similarly, in federalism or division of powers analyses, courts employ a variety of interpretive techniques such as “mutual modification” in order to reconcile seemingly conflicting heads of legislative power under sections 91 and
92 of the Constitution Act. For example, “the federal Parliament’s exclusive
power to legislate in relation to ‘trade and commerce’ (s. 91(2)) has been held
to exclude intraprovincial trade so as to not conflict with the provincial Legislatures’ exclusive power to legislate in relation to ‘property and civil rights in the
province’ (s. 92(13)).”4 As well, when confronted with French and English
versions of constitutional language, courts are called upon to reconcile the
versions in a manner that ensures that full effect is given to the meaning of
each.5
This technique of “reconciliation,” however, is not unique to constitutional
analysis. Judges on a daily basis use a host of interpretive tools to harmonize
provisions of a statute or a contract which appear contradictory or incompatible. Reconciling rights under the Charter is a similar exercise to those described
above, but takes on heightened significance owing to the nature of what is
being reconciled: fundamental human rights enshrined in Canada’s Constitution.
In its Charter jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Canada has articulated
several fundamental principles of Charter interpretation. First, it has consistently asserted that no Charter right is absolute. A particular Charter right must
be defined in relation to other rights and with a view to the underlying context
in which the apparent conflict arises. In the case of R. v. Crawford; R. v.
Creighton,6 the Supreme Court expressed this principle in the following way:
3

Id., at paras. 49-50.
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), at 33-26.
5
See, for instance, R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659 (per Sopinka J. in dissent); Mahe v.
Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342; R. v. Schmautz, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 398; Harvey v. New Brunswick
(Attorney General), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876; R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1296.
6
[1995] 1 S.C.R. 858.
4
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... Charter rights are not absolute in the sense that they cannot be applied to their
full extent regardless of the context. Application of Charter values must take into
account other interests and in particular other Charter values which may conflict
with their unrestricted and literal enforcement. 7

In R. v. Mills,8 this same concept was phrased in these terms:
At play in this appeal are three principles, which find their support in specific
provisions of the Charter ... No single principle is absolute and capable of trumping
the others; all must be defined in light of competing claims. 9

Closely related to this principle of Charter interpretation is the idea that there
is no hierarchy of rights in the Charter, nor should one be inferred from Charter
jurisprudence.10 This seminal statement of law was made by Lamer C.J. in
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation:11
A hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others, must be avoided,
both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the common law. When
the protected rights of two individuals come into conflict, as can occur in the case
of publication bans, Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that fully
respects the importance of both sets of rights.12

Finally, just as the Constitution — written and unwritten — must be viewed
as a coherent set of values,13 so too must the Charter be regarded and
7

Id., at para. 34.
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 [hereinafter “Mills”]
9
Id., at para. 61.
10
In one sense, the Charter does prescribe a hierarchy of rights in that some sections are subject to parliamentary override while others are not. The rights that can be overridden through the s.
33 notwithstanding clause include: s. 2 (freedom of religion, expression, assembly, association); ss.
7-14 (legal rights); s. 15 (equality). Professor Hogg argues that “Section 33 thus creates two tiers of
rights: the ‘common rights’ that are subject to override, and the ‘privileged rights’ that are not.” He
further explains, however, that “[t]he hierarchy of rights that I have described reflects the differences in the vulnerability of the right to legislative abridgement. It does not imply that the ‘privileged rights’ must take priority over the ‘common rights’ when they come into conflict.” Hogg,
supra, note 4, at 33-24 — 33-25.
11
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 [hereinafter “Dagenais”].
12
Id., at 877. See also R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411; Trinity Western University v.
British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada
(Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877; A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536; Chamberlain v.
Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87 (cited in dissent; appeal allowed by the majority on administrative law grounds only).
This is analogous to saying that no section of the Constitution trumps another in cases that are
not strictly Charter based. For instance, s. 2(b) or s. 15 of the Charter cannot be said to eclipse s.
93’s guarantee for funding of Roman Catholic separate schools in Ontario. See, for instance, Adler
v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609.
13
See generally Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra, note 2.
8
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interpreted as a unified whole. The Supreme Court of Canada has reaffirmed
this cardinal principle of Charter interpretation on many occasions. Most
recently, in Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of
Teachers,14 the Court repeated that “... the Charter must be read as a whole, so
that one right is not privileged at the expense of another.” 15 Many would argue
that it is not the role of courts to make normative judgments about which rights
should be prioritized at the expense of others. However, it is proper for courts
to give the fullest possible expression to all relevant Charter rights, having
regard to the broader factual context and to the other constitutional values at
stake.
With this as the conceptual backdrop, I turn now to the issue of rights
reconciliation. To quote the famous words of John Stuart Mill: “The only
freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own
way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their
efforts to obtain it.”16 The principle is easy to state, but difficult to apply.
Where does one draw the line when Charter rights appear to come into conflict?
How does one define where one right begins and one right ends? At what point
does one person’s freedom begin to impinge upon another’s? Concrete answers
to these weighty questions are elusive. The methodology that should be employed in answering them — that is, rights reconciliation — is not.
The key to rights reconciliation, in my view, lies in a fundamental appreciation for context. Charter rights are not defined in abstraction, but rather in the
particular factual matrix in which they arise. When understood in this way, the
exercise of reconciling competing Charter rights becomes a less onerous and
daunting task. My discussion will be divided into comparing reconciling rights
and justification balancing under section 1 of the Charter, followed by an overview of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on rights reconciliation. I then will
briefly deal with the basic principles to be gleaned from the jurisprudence and
the overall significance of rights reconciliation.

II. HOW DOES “RECONCILING” DIFFER FROM “BALANCING”
UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER?
Courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, often label the exercise of
giving content to two seemingly competing Charter rights “balancing.” In fact,
the two terms have been used interchangeably in Charter jurisprudence over the
14

[2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 [hereinafter “Trinity Western”].
Id., at para. 31.
16
J.S. Mill, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government (1869) (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1946), at 11.
15
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years. For example, courts speak of “balancing” the right of an accused to full
answer and defence with the right of a complainant to a reasonable expectation
of privacy in cases dealing with publication bans, or of “balancing” the right to
free speech against the right to be free from discrimination in hate propaganda
cases.
The Oxford English Dictionary17 defines “balance” as:
Balance: 1. To weigh (a matter); to estimate the two aspects or sides of anything;
to ponder. 2. To weigh two things, considerations, etc., against each other, so as to
ascertain which preponderates. 3. To counterbalance or counterpoise one thing by,
with, or against another. 4. To bring to or keep in equilibrium. (emphasis added).

The more correct term, however, may be “reconcile,” which implies
harmonizing seemingly contradictory things so as to render them compatible.
The term is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as:
Reconcile: 10. a. To make (discordant facts, statements, etc.) consistent, accordant,
or compatible with each other. 11. a. To make (an action, condition, quality, etc.)
compatible or consistent in fact or in one’s mind with another; to regard as
consistent with. b. To make (a theory, statement, author, etc.) agree with another or
with a fact; to show to be in agreement.18 (emphasis added).

The exercise in which courts engage when they define the content and scope
of rights in relation to one another, more closely approximates rights “reconciliation” than rights “balancing.” The latter term, which connotes assigning
primacy to one right over another right or interest after having weighed the
relevant considerations, is customarily used in section 1 Oakes test jurisprudence and is perhaps better suited to that sort of analysis.
The most obvious difference between “balancing” under section 1 and “reconciling” Charter rights stems from the nature of the actors involved. Under
section 1, the state must justify a violation of an individual’s Charter rights.
When reconciling competing Charter rights, on the other hand, a court seeks to
reconcile the constitutionally guaranteed rights of one individual with those of
another.19 Consequently, the onus of proof in each of these cases plays out
somewhat differently. Under section 1, the party challenging the impugned law
must establish a prima facie encroachment of a Charter right. The state then
bears the serious onus of defending or justifying the violation with reference to
the overall collective state interest in the Charter infringement.

17
18
19

Oxford English Dictionary, 2003 (online edition).
Id.
This is the classic dichotomy of “state v. individual” as opposed to “individual v. individ-

ual.”
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In the reconciling context, there is no rule about onus per se. If, for instance,
the common law is challenged as not striking the appropriate relationship between competing Charter rights, the party alleging this bears the burden of
demonstrating that the common law should be modified accordingly. The judiciary is then assigned the task of reconciling the competing rights. In Hill v.
Church of Scientology of Toronto,20 the Supreme Court described these differences in terms of onus in the following terms:
Finally, the division of onus which normally operates in a Charter challenge to
government action should not be applicable in a private litigation Charter “challenge” to the common law. This is not a situation in which one party must prove a
prima facie violation of a right while the other bears the onus of defending it.
Rather, the party who is alleging that the common law is inconsistent with the
Charter should bear the onus of proving both that the common law fails to comply
with Charter values and that, when these values are balanced, the common law
should be modified. In the ordinary situation, where government action is said to
violate a Charter right, it is appropriate that the government undertake the justification for the impugned statute or common law rule. However, the situation is very
different where two private parties are involved in a civil suit. One party will have
brought the action on the basis of the prevailing common law which may have a
long history of acceptance in the community. That party should be able to rely upon
that law and should not be placed in the position of having to defend it. It is up to
the party challenging the common law to bear the burden of proving not only that
the common law is inconsistent with Charter values but also that its provisions
cannot be justified.21

Furthermore, justification under section 1 is arguably more broad-based than
rights reconciliation, in that it takes into account various societal factors, rather
than just a countervailing Charter right. In his book, Constitutional Law of
Canada, Professor Peter Hogg states that “Section 1 of the Charter ... implicitly
authorizes the courts to balance the guaranteed rights [of individuals] against
competing societal values.”22 In other words, under section 1, “the Court must
decide whether the enacting legislative body has made the appropriate compromise between the civil libertarian value guaranteed by the Charter and the
competing social or economic objectives pursued by the law.” 23 This idea was
also articulated by the Supreme Court in Mills:

20

[1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 [hereinafter “Hill”].
Id., at para. 98.
22
Hogg, supra, note 4, at 33-39. In R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, the Court stated, at
136, “It may become necessary to limit rights and freedoms in circumstances where their exercise
would be inimical to the realization of collective goals of fundamental importance.”
23
Hogg, supra, note 4, at 33-10.
21
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In contrast, s. 1 is concerned with the values underlying a free and democratic
society, which are broader in nature. In R. v. Oakes, … Dickson C.J. stated that
these values and principles “embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality,
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity,
and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of
individuals and groups in society.” In R. v. Keegstra …, Dickson C.J. described
such values and principles as “numerous, covering the guarantees enumerated in
the Charter and more.24

In R. v. Keegstra,25 the Supreme Court noted that the balancing exercise
under section 1 was not restricted to values explicitly set out in the Charter. In
that case, the Supreme Court did not specifically pit freedom of expression
against freedom from discrimination in the section 1 justification exercise.
Rather, the Court considered a series of factors in the overall justification
analysis including: the fact that sections 15 and 27 represented a strong commitment to equality and multiculturalism; the harmful effect of hate propaganda
on society at large; the contribution of hate propaganda to racial and religious
tension in Canada, and the international human rights obligations undertaken by
Canada aimed at eradicating discrimination. Keegstra is therefore illustrative of
the broad-based balancing that takes place under section 1, an exercise which,
as indicated above, differs in notable respects from that of rights reconciliation.
One final comment: with rights reconciliation, courts are not dealing with a
Charter violation. Consequently, it is important to focus on the values of the
different Charter rights in dealing with the problem before the Court, which
means that there will be an examination of the underlying interests at stake as
reflected in the Charter provisions at play. Thus, the exercise of reconciling
rights does not necessarily mean a full exploration of a Charter infringement, as
one would expect with a direct Charter challenge.

III.

RECONCILING CHARTER RIGHTS: SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA JURISPRUDENCE

Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of rights reconciliation reveals the Court’s approach to seemingly conflicting Charter rights and speaks
considerably about how courts should tackle this challenging task. My analysis
herein is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the case law on rights
reconciliation. Rather, it serves both to provide concrete illustrations of situations where the Charter rights of one individual have seemingly come into
24
25

Mills, supra, note 8, at para. 67 (citations omitted).
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [hereinafter “Keegstra”].
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conflict with those of another, and to describe how the Supreme Court has
addressed this conflict so as to give the most generous possible expression to
both sets of rights. For purposes of discussion only, I have grouped the Supreme Court cases under specific contextual headings.
1. Publication Ban and Confidentiality Order Cases
Cases involving publication bans or confidentiality orders usually engage the
right to freedom of expression and the right to full answer and defence. Dagenais, the leading case in this regard, established the theoretical framework for
rights reconciliation not only as it pertains to publication bans, but in various
other contexts as well. At issue in Dagenais was a publication ban prohibiting
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation from televising the special, “The Boys
of St. Vincent”26 during the trial of the accused, members of a religious order
who had been charged with sexual and physical abuse of boys in their care. The
question facing the Court was whether the common law rule governing publication bans — that those seeking a ban must demonstrate that there is a real and
substantial risk of interference with the right to a fair trial — provided sufficient protection for freedom of expression in a post-Charter society. The Court
concluded that the common law rule relating to publication bans prioritized the
right to a fair trial over the free expression interests of those affected by the
ban. The Court noted that “the balance this rule strikes is inconsistent with the
principles of the Charter, and in particular, the equal status given by the Charter
to ss. 2(b) and 11(d).”27 Chief Justice Lamer reasoned that it would be inappropriate to continue to apply a common law rule that automatically favoured the
rights protected by section 11(d) over those protected by 2(b), as a hierarchical
approach to rights had to be avoided. He thus found it essential to alter the
common law rule governing publication bans so as to reflect Charter values. He
stated:
I am, therefore, of the view that it is necessary to reformulate the common law rule
governing the issuance of publication bans in a manner that reflects the principles
of the Charter. Given that publication bans, by their very definition, curtail the
freedom of expression of third parties, I believe that the common law rule must be
adapted so as to require a consideration both of the objectives of a publication ban,
and the proportionality of the ban to its effect on protected Charter rights. The
modified rule may be stated as follows:
A publication ban should only be ordered when:
26

The four-hour mini-series, “The Boys of St. Vincent” was a fictional account of sexual
and physical abuse of children in a religious institution.
27
Dagenais, supra, note 11, at 877.
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Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the
fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will
not prevent the risk; and
The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects
to the free expression of those affected by the ban.28

(emphasis in original).

The Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that this framework “clearly
reflects the substance of the Oakes test when assessing legislation under s. 1 of
the Charter,”29 and in particular, the third part of the proportionality analysis
under Oakes. In applying the analysis to the facts of Dagenais, the Supreme
Court concluded that the publication ban could not be upheld. While the ban
was clearly directed toward preventing a real and substantial risk to the fairness
of the trial of the accused, it was not necessary on the facts of the case. The ban
was far too broad, since it prohibited broadcast throughout Canada as well as
reporting on the ban itself. Furthermore, reasonable alternative measures were
available to achieve the objective of trial fairness without circumscribing the
expressive rights of third parties (for example, adjourning trials, changing
venues, sequestering jurors, etc.).
A publication ban was also in issue in R. v. Mentuck.30 In that case, the accused was charged with second degree murder. At his first trial, a stay of proceedings was entered after certain evidence was ruled inadmissible. Following
this trial, the accused was targeted by the RCMP in an undercover investigation, and the indictment was ultimately reinstated as a result of the evidence
obtained in the investigation. During the trial, the Crown moved for a publication ban to protect from disclosure the identity of the officers and the operational methods employed by the RCMP in the investigation. The accused and
two newspapers opposed the motion. The trial judge granted a one-year ban
28

Id., at 878.
Id.
30
[2001] S.C.J. No. 73 [hereinafter “Mentuck”]. Mentuck was heard together with a companion case, R. v. O.N.E., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478.
After the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Dagenais (and prior to Mentuck), the Supreme Court heard the case of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. New Brunswick (Attorney
General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 [hereinafter “New Brunswick”]. Although New Brunswick was a s. 1
case, it nonetheless informed the analysis in Mentuck. In New Brunswick, the Court considered the
issue of the power of the court to exclude media and the public from a portion of a sentencing
proceeding for sexual assault and sexual interference under s. 486(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46. Justice LaForest, writing for a unanimous Court, found that the exclusion was a
violation of the freedom of the press under s. 2(b), but that it was demonstrably justified under s. 1
of the Charter. He then found, building upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Dagenais, that the
trial judge must conduct a similar exercise in applying s. 286(1) as in applying the common law
rule.
29
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relating to the identity of the police officers involved, but refused a ban with
respect to the RCMP’s operational methods. The accused was ultimately acquitted of the murder.
While in Dagenais, there was an apparent conflict between freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial, in Mentuck, both of these militated against
imposing a publication ban. In this regard, the Court noted:
... the facts of [Mentuck] invoke a different purpose and different interests from
those raised by the facts of Dagenais. While the Court in Dagenais was required to
reconcile the accused’s interest in a fair trial with society’s interest in freedom of
expression, the accused’s right to a fair trial [in Mentuck is] not ... in issue. Indeed,
the accused wishes to have the information disclosed, and views the publication of
certain of the details of his arrest and trial as essential to the fulfilment of his fair
trial interest. Instead, it is the Crown that seeks a publication ban in order to protect
the safety of police officers and preserve the efficacy of undercover police
operations. Thus, a literal application of the test as set out in Dagenais will not
properly account for the interests to be balanced.31

The competing consideration in Mentuck was not a Charter right per se, but
broader concerns for the administration of justice. The Supreme Court therefore
concluded that the test established in Dagenais — premised on part 3 of the
proportionality analysis in Oakes — had to be “reconfigured” to account for the
different purpose for which the order was sought in Mentuck and for the different effects it would have. The Court pointed out:
Were we to simply weigh, as in Dagenais, the accused’s right to a fair trial and the
public interest in freedom of expression, this would be an open and shut inquiry,
since both of the competing interests recognized in the factual context of Dagenais
are aligned in opposition to granting the ban.
However, the common law rule under which the trial judge considered the publication ban in this case is broader than its specific application in Dagenais. The
rule can accommodate orders that must occasionally be made in the interests of the
administration of justice, which encompass more than fair trial rights. As the test is
intended to “reflec[t] the substance of the Oakes test”, we cannot require that Charter rights be the only legitimate objective of such orders any more than we require
that government action or legislation in violation of the Charter be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another Charter right … Dagenais envisioned situations
where the right to a fair trial and the right to free expression directly conflicted, and
the specific terms Lamer C.J. used in that case were tailored to apply in that situation. Accordingly, the test we must apply in order to determine whether the common law rule allowing trial judges to issue publication bans in the interest of the

31

Mentuck, id., at para. 28.
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proper administration of justice will differ in specific content from the test used in
Dagenais, though not in basic principle.32

The Supreme Court in Mentuck thus modified the second part of the Dagenais framework, such that a publication ban should only be ordered when:
… the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the
rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to
free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of
the administration of justice.33
(emphasis added).

The Court acknowledged that this tailoring of the Dagenais framework was
not designed to “disturb the essence of the test, but to restate it in terms that
more plainly recognize ... that publication bans may invoke more interests and
rights than the rights to trial fairness and freedom of expression.”34
In Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance),35 the Supreme
Court considered the proper analytical approach to be applied to the exercise of
judicial discretion where a litigant seeks a confidentiality order under Rule 151
of the Federal Court Rules. In that case, Sierra Club, an environmental
organization, sought judicial review of the federal government’s decision to
provide financial assistance to Atomic Energy of Canada for the construction
and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China. Atomic Energy filed an
affidavit in the proceedings which summarized confidential documents
containing technical information regarding the ongoing environmental
assessment. Sierra Club sought production of these confidential documents,
while Atomic Energy resisted production. Chinese authorities authorized
disclosure of the documents on the condition that they be protected by a
confidentiality order, such that the contents would only be made available to
the parties and the court. The Federal Court rejected the application for a
confidentiality order, a decision which was upheld by the Federal Court of
Appeal.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the strong similarities between
publication bans and confidentiality orders in the context of judicial
proceedings: in both cases, a restriction on freedom of expression is sought in
order to preserve or promote an interest engaged by those proceedings. In
Sierra Club, the Supreme Court recognized that there was a conflict between
the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the principle of open and accessible
32
33
34
35

Id., at paras. 30-31 (citations omitted).
Id., at para. 32.
Id., at para. 33.
[2002] S.C.J. No. 42 [hereinafter “Sierra Club”].
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court proceedings, which it found was inextricably linked to freedom of expression. The Supreme Court once again drew upon the Dagenais analysis, this
time applying it to confidentiality orders. The Court concluded that a
confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:
a)

such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation
because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on
the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects,
including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.36
The Court found that while the confidentiality order would have a significant
salutary effect on the defendant’s right to a fair trial and would assist in the
search for truth, it would also result in the public being denied access to the
contents of the documents in question. Given, however, the highly technical
nature of the documents and the minimal impact that the order would have on
the core values underlying freedom of expression, the Supreme Court
concluded that the salutary effects of a confidentiality order outweighed its
deleterious consequences.
2. Medical Records Cases
In R. v. O’Connor,37 the Supreme Court considered the process that should
govern production of a complainant’s medical and therapeutic records held in
the hands of third parties in a sexual assault case. Chief Justice Lamer and
Sopinka J. for the majority on this issue noted that the rights in issue were the
right to privacy and the right to full answer and defence:
In recognizing that all individuals have a right to privacy which should be protected as much as is reasonably possible, we should not lose sight of the possibility
of occasioning a miscarriage of justice by establishing a procedure which unduly
restricts an accused’s ability to access information which may be necessary for
meaningful full answer and defence.38

36

Id., at para. 53.
[1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 [hereinafter “O’Connor”]. O’Connor was heard together with the
companion case, A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536.
38
Id., O’Connor, at para. 18.
37
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They emphasized that when the defence seeks information in the hands of a
third party (as opposed to the state) two considerations operate so as to justify
shifting the onus of proof and establishing a higher threshold of relevance:
(1)

the information is not part of the state’s “case to meet” nor has the state
been granted access to the information in preparing its case; and

(2)

third parties have no obligation to assist the defence.39

In light of these factors, Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. concluded that “at the
first stage in the production procedure, the onus should be on the accused to
satisfy a judge that the information is likely to be relevant.”40 This stage, in
their view, should be confined to the issue of “whether the right to make full
answer and defence is implicated by information contained in the records.”41
The second stage of the inquiry requires a judge to examine the records in
question to determine whether they should be produced. This entails a weighing
of the salutary and deleterious effects of a production order to assess “whether a
non-production order would constitute a reasonable limit on the ability of the
accused to make full answer and defence.” 42 In this weighing exercise, courts
should consider the following factors:
(1) the extent to which the record is necessary for the accused to make full
answer and defence;
(2) the probative value of the record in question;
(3) the nature and extent of the reasonable expectation of privacy vested in
that record;
(4) whether production of the record would be premised upon any discriminatory belief or bias;
(5) the potential prejudice to the complainant’s dignity, privacy or security
of the person that would be occasioned by production of the record in
question.43

39

Id., at para. 19.
Id., (emphasis in original). Chief Justice Lamer and Sopinka J. stated at para. 22 that the
test of “relevance” in the context of production should be higher than that in the disclosure context:
“the presiding judge must be satisfied that there is a reasonable possibility that the information is
logically probative to an issue at trial or the competence of a witness to testify,” but that this
“should not be interpreted as an onerous burden upon the accused.” (emphasis in original), at para.
24.
41
Id., at para. 21.
42
Id., at para. 30.
43
Id., at para. 31.
40
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In response to O’Connor, Parliament drafted Bill C-46, which was proclaimed into force on May 12, 1997. The Bill amended the Criminal Code to
include sections 278.1 to 278.91, which now govern the production of records
in sexual offence proceedings. The accused in Mills, who had been charged
with one count of sexual assault and one count of unlawful sexual touching,
brought a constitutional challenge attacking the validity of these provisions on
the basis that they violated sections 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.
In Mills, the Supreme Court observed:
The resolution of this appeal requires understanding how to define competing
rights, avoiding the hierarchical approach rejected by this Court in Dagenais… On
the one hand stands the accused’s right to make full answer and defence. On the
other hand stands the complainant’s and witness’s right to privacy. Neither right
may be defined in such a way as to negate the other and both sets of rights are
informed by the equality rights at play in this context. Underlying this question is
the relationship between the courts and Parliament when Parliament alters a
judicially created common law procedure that already embodies Charter
standards.44

On the proper approach to the competing Charter rights in Mills, the Court
stated:
As this Court’s decision in Dagenais, supra, makes clear, Charter rights must be
examined in a contextual manner to resolve conflicts between them. Therefore,
unlike s. 1 balancing, where societal interests are sometimes allowed to override
Charter rights, under s. 7 rights must be defined so that they do not conflict with
each other. The rights of full answer and defence, and privacy, must be defined in
light of each other, and both must be defined in light of the equality provisions of s.
15.45

The Court noted that Bill C-46 differed in salient respects from the regime
contemplated in O’Connor.46 Though the respondent and several interveners
44

[1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 17 (citations omitted).
Id., at para. 21.
46
The Court described these differences at paras. 53-54 of Mills:
This brings us to the heart of the Bill — the process established to govern the production of private records to an accused person in sexual offence proceedings. Like O’Connor,
Parliament has set up a two-stage process: (1) disclosure to the judge; and (2) production to
the accused. At the first stage, the accused must establish that the record sought is “likely
relevant to an issue at trial or to the competence of a witness to testify” and that “the production of the record is necessary in the interests of justice” (s. 278.5(1)). Bill C-46 diverges from O’Connor by directing the trial judge to consider the salutary and deleterious
effects of production to the court on the accused’s right to full answer and defence and the
complainant’s or witness’s right to privacy and equality. A series of factors is listed that the
45
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argued that Bill C-46 was unconstitutional to the extent that it created a process
for production that diverged from or was inconsistent with that established in
O’Connor, the Court opined that “it does not follow from the fact that a law
passed by Parliament differs from a regime envisaged by the Court in the
absence of a statutory scheme, that Parliament’s law is unconstitutional.
Parliament may build on the Court’s decision, and develop a different scheme
as long as it remains constitutional.”47
The Court observed that the three relevant principles at play in Mills were
full answer and defence, privacy, and equality. Justice McLachlin (as she then
was) and I stated in this regard:
As Lamer C.J. stated in Dagenais, … “When the protected rights of two individuals
come into conflict ... Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that fully
respects the importance of both sets of rights.” This illustrates the importance of
interpreting rights in a contextual manner — not because they are of intermittent
importance but because they often inform, and are informed by, other similarly
deserving rights or values at play in particular circumstances. 48

After reviewing these three principles in detail, the majority concluded that
the Criminal Code provisions in issue in Mills passed constitutional scrutiny.
While it was undisputed that Bill C-46 diverged notably from what the
Supreme Court had envisioned in O’Connor, “these differences [were] not fatal
because Bill C-46 provide[d] sufficient protection for all relevant Charter
rights.”49
M. (A.) v. Ryan50 was essentially the civil equivalent of O’Connor. Justice
McLachlin (as she then was) characterized the issue in Ryan as: “Should a
defendant’s right to relevant material to the end of testing the plaintiff’s case
outweigh the plaintiff’s expectation that communications between her and her
trial judge is directed to take into account in deciding whether the document should be produced to the court (s. 278.5(2)) …
If the requirements of this first stage are met, the record will be ordered produced to
the trial judge. At the second stage, the judge looks at the record in the absence of the parties (s. 278.6(1)), holds a hearing if necessary (s. 278.6(2)), and determines whether the record should be produced on the basis that it is “likely relevant to an issue at trial or to the
competence of a witness to testify” and that its production is “necessary in the interests of
justice” (s. 278.7). Again at this stage, the judge must consider the salutary and deleterious
effects on the accused’s right to make full answer and defence and on the right to privacy
and equality of the complainant or witness, and is directed to “take into account” the factors
set out at s. 278.5(2): s. 278.7(2). When ordering production, the judge may impose conditions on production: s. 278.7(3).
47
Id., at para. 55.
48
Id., at para. 61 (citations omitted).
49
Id., at para. 22.
50
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 157 [hereinafter “Ryan”].
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psychiatrist will be kept in confidence?”51 The Supreme Court then examined
the relevant competing Charter rights (privacy, fair trial, equality) under the
fourth Wigmore criterion for privilege: that the interests served by protecting
the communication from disclosure outweigh the interest of pursuing the truth
and disposing correctly of the litigation. 52 The Court considered its decision in
O’Connor and noted:
Just as justice requires that the accused in a criminal case be permitted to answer
the Crown’s case, so justice requires that a defendant in a civil suit be permitted to
answer the plaintiff’s case. In deciding whether he or she is entitled to production
of confidential documents, this requirement must be balanced against the privacy
interest of the complainant.53

Justice McLachlin was careful to point out that the interest in disclosure of a
defendant in a civil suit may be less compelling than the parallel interest of an
accused charged with a crime. In a civil case, the defendant stands to lose
money and repute; the accused in a criminal proceeding, on the other hand,
stands to forfeit his or her liberty. The balance, therefore, between the interest
in disclosure and the complainant’s interest in privacy may be struck at a
different level in civil and criminal cases. Justice McLachlin ultimately held
that it is open to a judge to conclude that psychiatrist-patient records are
privileged in appropriate circumstances. Once the first three Wigmore
requirements for privilege are satisfied and a compelling prima facie case for
protection is established, the focus will be on balancing under the fourth
Wigmore criterion. Justice McLachlin emphasized:
The result depends on the balance of the competing interests of disclosure and
privacy in each case. It must be borne in mind that in most cases, the majority of
the communications between a psychiatrist and her patient will have little or no
bearing on the case at bar and can safely be excluded from production. Fishing
expeditions are not appropriate where there is a compelling privacy interest at

51

Id., at para. 1.
It should be recalled that the Wigmore criteria are designed to guide a court’s determination of whether privilege should attach to a particular relationship. The four Wigmore criteria are:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance
of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must
be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
J.H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 3rd ed., Vol. 8. Revised by J.T.
McNaughton (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), at para. 2285.
53
Ryan, supra, note 50, at para. 36.
52
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stake, even at the discovery stage. Finally, where justice requires that
communications be disclosed, the court should consider qualifying the disclosure
by imposing limits aimed at permitting the opponent to have the access justice
requires while preserving the confidential nature of the documents to the greatest
degree possible.54
(emphasis added).

3. Religious Freedoms Cases
Trinity Western University, a private institution associated with the
Evangelical Free Church of Canada, established “Community Standards” which
were applicable to all staff and students. These included a list of “Biblically
Condemned” practices, one of which was homosexual behaviour. Trinity
Western applied to the British Columbia College of Teachers to assume full
responsibility for its teaching programme, which had previously been
conducted partially under the aegis of another university. The B.C. College of
Teachers refused to approve the application on the grounds that it was contrary
to the public interest for it to approve a programme offered by an institution
which appeared to follow discriminatory practices. The Court characterized the
issue at the heart of the appeal as how to reconcile the religious freedoms of
individuals wishing to attend Trinity Western with the concerns of students in
the B.C. school system (concerns that may be shared by society generally). The
Court held that any potential conflict between religious freedoms and equality
rights should be resolved through a proper demarcation of the rights and values
involved. The proper place to draw the line in this case, according to the
Supreme Court, was between belief (that is, freedom to hold religious
convictions) and conduct (that is, acting on discriminatory beliefs). The Court
stated:
The freedom to hold beliefs is much broader than the freedom to act on them.
Absent concrete evidence that training teachers at TWU fosters discrimination in
the public schools of B.C., the freedom of individuals to adhere to certain religious
beliefs while at TWU should be respected. The BCCT, rightfully, does not require
public universities with teacher education programs to screen out applicants who
hold sexist, racist or homophobic beliefs. For better or worse, tolerance of divergent beliefs is a hallmark of a democratic society.
Acting on those beliefs, however, is a different matter. If a teacher in a school
system engages in discriminatory conduct, that teacher can be subject to disciplinary hearings before the BCCT ... In this way, the scope of the freedom of religion

54

Id., at para. 37.
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and equality rights that have come into conflict in this appeal can be circumscribed
and thereby reconciled.55

In B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto,56 the Supreme
Court considered the case where parents’ religious freedom was said to be in
conflict with the section 7 right to life, liberty and security of person of their
child. The majority of the Court found that the relevant provisions of the Child
Welfare Act,57 infringed the appellants’ freedom of religion under section 2(a)
of the Charter. Justice LaForest for the majority on this issue found that section
2(a), which commanded a liberal interpretation, extended to “the right of parents to rear their children according to their religious beliefs, including that of
choosing medical and other treatments ...”58 He then held that since the Supreme Court has “consistently refrained from formulating internal limits to the
scope of freedom of religion in cases where the constitutionality of a legislative
scheme [is] raised,” it would be more appropriate to “leave to the state the
burden of justifying the restrictions it has chosen [under s. 1].”59 Justice LaForest ultimately concluded that the restrictions that the Act placed on parental
rights under section 2(a) were amply justified under the Oakes test.
The analytical approach that Major J. and I adopted in B. (R.) differed from
that of the majority. We categorized the relevant issue as: “to what extent can
an infant’s right to life, liberty and health be subordinated to conduct emanating from a parent’s religious convictions?”60 We then concluded that the
appellant parents “[did] not benefit from the protection of s. 2(a) of the Charter
since freedom of religion does not include the imposition upon a child of religious practices which threaten the safety, health or life of the child.” 61 In other
words, we defined freedom of religion as not extending to the right of a parent
to make religious choices that would jeopardize the section 7 Charter rights of a
child. By defining freedom of religion in this way, a conflict between rights
was avoided. We stated:

55

[2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, at paras. 36-37.
[1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 [hereinafter “B. (R.)”].
57
R.S.O. 1980, c. 66. The pleadings primarily focused on the constitutionality of s.
19(1)(b)(ix) of the Act, which defined “child in need of protection” as “a child where the person in
whose charge the child is neglects or refuses to provide or obtain proper medical, surgical or other
recognized remedial care or treatment necessary for the child’s health or well-being, or refuses to
permit such care or treatment to be supplied to the child when it is recommended by a legally
qualified medical practitioner, or otherwise fails to protect the child adequately.”
58
Id., at para. 105.
59
B. (R.), supra, note 56, at paras. 109-110.
60
Id., at para. 225.
61
Id.
56
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Just as there are limits to the ambit of freedom of expression (e.g. s. 2(b) does not
protect violent acts…) so are there limits to the scope of s. 2(a), especially so when
this provision is called upon to protect activity that threatens the physical or
psychological well-being of others. In other words, although the freedom of belief
may be broad, the freedom to act upon those beliefs is considerably narrower, and
it is the latter freedom at issue in this case.62

Justice LaForest for the majority was of the view that the balancing required
between freedom of religion, on the one hand, and life, liberty and security of
person, on the other, must take place under section 1, as the Charter “makes no
provision for directly balancing constitutional rights against one another.” 63
While I note the relevance of this reasoning, it seems to me that rights
reconciliation — quite apart from the balancing required under the section 1
analysis — has an important and unique role in Charter jurisprudence and was
appropriate to use in this case. Justice Major and I addressed this critique of our
approach in B. (R.):
Although many of the competing rights discussed in this appeal could perhaps
be integrated into a s. 1 analysis as was done by La Forest J. ..., we believe this is
inappropriate in the present case. Such an approach elevates choosing to refuse
one’s child necessary medical care on account of one’s personal convictions to the
level of constitutionally protected activity. Moreover, this approach obliges s. 1 almost single-handedly to play the role of balancing diverse interests. Although s. 1
may be the appropriate forum for balancing the interests of the state against the
rights violation of the aggrieved individual, such a balance is not required in the
case at bar. The nexus of the balancing operates between Sheena’s right to life and
security of the person and her parents’ right to freedom of religion. We are not convinced that s. 1 should be the exclusive balancing agent between two individuals’
positive and negative liberties.64

IV.

OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES TO BE GLEANED FROM CASES ON
RIGHTS RECONCILIATION

Despite the differing factual backdrops, the cases described above reveal
certain overarching principles about the concept of rights reconciliation. First,
and perhaps most importantly, rights reconciliation cannot take place in a
vacuum. As is true with a section 1 analysis, courts engaging in rights
reconciliation must be acutely sensitive to context. Second, in most instances,
rights reconciliation requires a court to conduct an analysis such as the one

62
63
64

Id., at para. 226 (citations omitted).
Id., at paras. 117-118.
Id., at para. 233.
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contemplated in the third branch of the proportionality test under Oakes. Third,
the exercise of rights reconciliation is a flexible one, such that a given
framework for reconciling Charter rights may be modified to take into
consideration other factors if necessary. Finally, in most cases, it is
inappropriate to conceive of Charter rights as “clashing” or “colliding,” as this
is fundamentally incongruous with the notion of “reconciling” rights. Each of
these broad principles is examined in more detail below.
1. Rights Reconciliation is Guided by Context
The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the importance of context
in Charter jurisprudence, particularly in the section 1 analysis. In Thomson
Newspapers v. Canada (Attorney General),65 for instance, Bastarache J. wrote
for a majority of the Court:
The analysis under s. 1 of the Charter must be undertaken with a close attention
to context. This is inevitable as the test devised in R. v. Oakes requires a court to
establish the objective of the impugned provision, which can only be accomplished
by canvassing the nature of the social problem which it addresses. Similarly, the
proportionality of the means used to fulfil the pressing and substantial objective can
only be evaluated through a close attention to detail and factual setting. In essence,
context is the indispensable handmaiden to the proper characterization of the objective of the impugned provision, to determining whether that objective is justified,
and to weighing whether the means used are sufficiently closely related to the valid
objective so as to justify an infringement of a Charter right.66

Context is an equally crucial consideration when courts seek to reconcile the
Charter rights of one individual with those of another.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on rights reconciliation demonstrates
that a different relationship may be struck between various Charter rights in one
case from that in another. Rights reconciliation is therefore highly contextually
sensitive. For instance, McLachlin J. (as she then was) noted in Ryan that the
right to privacy, the right to a fair trial and the right to equality from discrimination may align differently in cases involving production of medical records
depending on whether the proceeding is civil or criminal in nature. She ultimately concluded that “documents produced in a criminal case may not always
be producible in a civil case, where the privacy interest of the complainant may
more easily outweigh the defendant’s interest in production.”67 This sentiment
was reiterated in Mentuck, where the Court stated that “the relevant rights and
65
66
67

[1998] 1 S.C.R. 877.
Id., at para. 87 (citation omitted).
Ryan, supra, note 50, at para. 36.
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interests will be aligned differently in different cases, and the purposes and
effects invoked by the parties must be taken into account in a case-specific
manner.”68
Context, then, determines where the line should be drawn between the competing Charter rights in a given case. In the words of the Supreme Court in
Mills:
Considered in the abstract, these principles of fundamental justice may seem to
conflict. The conflict is resolved by considering conflicting rights in the factual
context of each particular case. Therefore, we do not say that a complainant’s right
to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure may be justifiably infringed by
the accused’s right to make full answer and defence or vice versa. Rather, part of
what defines both a reasonable search or seizure and full answer and defence is a
full appreciation of these principles of fundamental justice as they operate within a
particular context.69
(emphasis added).

2. Rights Reconciliation Usually Involves a Proportionality-Type Analysis
Such as the One Contemplated Under Oakes
The analyses involved in reconciling rights often involve a consideration of
the deleterious effects of the measures which limit the right in question and the
objective sought to be achieved by the limitation of the right, as well as a consideration of the deleterious and salutary effects of the measures themselves.
This directly reflects the approach taken in part 3 of the proportionality analysis. At this point, it is worth noting that this third branch of the proportionality
analysis under Oakes — which some have argued is redundant in the section 1
analysis70 — is criticized in the rights reconciliation context as being too sub68

Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, at para. 37.
Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 63.
70
See for instance, Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997),
at 35-39, where he states:
Obedient to Oakes, when the Court engages in s. 1 analysis, it always goes through the
motion of this fourth step. So far as I can tell, however, this step has never had any influence on the outcome of any case. And I think that the reason for this is that it is redundant.
It is really a restatement of the first step, the requirement that a limiting law pursue an objective that is sufficiently important to justify overriding a Charter right. If a law is sufficiently important to justify overriding a Charter right (first step), and if the law is rationally
connected to the objective (second step), and if the law impairs the Charter right no more
than is necessary to accomplish the objective (third step), how could its effects then be
judged to be too severe? (emphasis added).
But see R. Sharpe, K. Swinton & K. Roach, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002), at 68-69, who state:
69
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jective. In short, the critics assert that part 3 of the proportionality test leaves
too much interpretive room for courts to decide these Charter cases appropriately and consistently. In my view, the third branch of the proportionality test
provides an analytically coherent framework to guide judicial discretion, so that
it is not arbitrary and unfettered. There can be no rigid rule for courts to apply
when confronted with seemingly conflicting rights, as this would run afoul of
the Supreme Court’s pivotal statement in Dagenais eschewing a hierarchical
approach to Charter rights. Part 3 of the proportionality test, on the other hand,
equips the judiciary with a workable framework to delineate between competing Charter rights in a principled and case-specific manner. Or, in the words of
the Supreme Court in Mentuck, “This test exists to ground the exercise of discretion in a constitutionally sound manner, not to command the same result in
every case.”71
In Dagenais, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the overlap between
part 3 of the proportionality analysis and the reconciliation of sections 2(b) and
11(d) of the Charter:
The analysis that is required at this stage of the application of the common law rule
is very similar to the third part of the second branch of the analysis required under
s. 1 of the Charter, as set out by this Court in R. v. Oakes.72

As noted in the discussion on Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Dagenais
framework was reconfigured and then used in subsequent cases such as
Mentuck, O’Connor, and Sierra Club. In Sierra Club, the Court stated:
Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context, the Dagenais framework utilizes overarching Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights
and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances. As a
result, the analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under Rule 151 should

Until recently, this final balancing step has not been decisive and was thought by
many to be redundant. It appeared unlikely that the Court would ever find that the objective
was of sufficient importance to justify overriding a protected freedom, and that the least intrusive means had been employed, but nevertheless conclude that on balance the effects on
the right were disproportionate ... More recently, however, this final stage has taken on
more importance ... If the fourth part of the proportionality review continues to assume increasing importance, governments will bear a greater obligation to demonstrate that the impugned legislation is not only rationally connected to its objectives, but effective in
achieving the objectives. This stage will also require the courts to balance the effectiveness
of the violation in achieving the government’s objective against the harms of denying the
Charter right. (emphasis added).
71
Mentuck, supra, note 68, at para. 37.
72
Dagenais, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at 887.

Job name: SCLR vol 20 CRA

Date:Tuesday, March 06, 2012

(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d)

“Reconciling Rights”

159

echo the underlying principles laid out in Dagenais, supra, although it must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged in this case.73

The appeal of a Dagenais-type framework in the rights reconciliation context
is that it allows courts to make case-specific determinations without sacrificing
legal precedent or principle.
3. “Clash” Imagery May be Inapposite
In Dagenais, Lamer C.J. emphasized that it was important to recognize that
“publication bans should not always be seen as a clash between two titans —
freedom of expression for the media versus the right to a fair trial for the accused.”74 He provides three reasons for rejecting what he terms the “clash
model”:
First, it is more suited to American than to Canadian jurisprudence, since the
American Constitution has no equivalent of s. 1 of our Charter, which, as I
discussed earlier, is also a source of the fundamental principles informing the
development of the common law in Canada.
Second, it is not the case that freedom of expression and the accused’s right to a
fair trial are always in conflict. Sometimes publicity serves important interests in
the fair trial process. For example, in the context of publication bans connected to
criminal proceedings, these interests include the accused’s interest in public scrutiny of the court process, and all of the participants in the court process.
Third, the analysis of publication bans should be much richer than the clash
model suggests. Rather than simply focusing on the fact that bans always limit
freedom of expression and usually aim to protect the right to a fair trial of the accused, it should be recognized that ordering bans may ... 75

Chief Justice Lamer went on to provide a comprehensive review of the
advantages and disadvantages associated with publication bans.
That courts should approach seemingly clashing rights with a view to how
both can be given proper recognition appears as a theme in the Supreme Court
case law dealing with rights reconciliation. In O’Connor, for instance,
L’Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting) stated:
I would emphasize that the imagery of conflicting rights which it conjures up may
not always be appropriate. One such example is the interrelation between the
equality rights of complainants in sexual assault trials and the rights of the accused
to a fair trial. The eradication of discriminatory beliefs and practices in the conduct
73
74
75

Sierra Club, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, at para. 38 (emphasis added).
Dagenais, supra, note 72, at 881.
Id., at 882.
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of such trials will enhance rather than detract from the fairness of such trials.
Conversely, sexual assault trials that are fair will promote the equality of women
and children, who are most often the victims. 76

It is especially inappropriate to conceive of rights as conflicting when engaging in “definitional” balancing or reconciliation.77 The approach of Major J. and
myself in B. (R.) is a classic example of definitional reconciliation. Where a
parent’s right to religion is defined as not extending to the right to allow for
religious medical choices which can harm a child, there really is no conflict
between freedom of religion and life, liberty, and security of the person. This
sentiment was echoed in Trinity Western where the Supreme Court noted that
“this is a case where any potential conflict should be resolved through the
proper delineation of the rights and values involved. In essence, properly
defining the scope of the rights avoids a conflict in this case.”78 (emphasis
added).
4. The Exercise of Reconciling Rights is Flexible
An overview of Supreme Court case law in the area of rights reconciliation
reveals the flexibility of the Dagenais (or a Dagenais-type) approach to reconciling Charter rights. As Mentuck and Sierra Club illustrate, the Dagenais
framework can be modified and applied to new factual scenarios where Charter
rights seemingly conflict. In Sierra Club, the Court said:
Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context,
the Dagenais framework utilizes overarching Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights
and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances.79

Therefore, in Mentuck, the Supreme Court broadened the approach to publication bans in recognition of the fact that there may be situations where other
interests — apart from the competing Charter rights — may need to be considered. In Mentuck, this “other interest” was an interest in the overall administration of justice. In this regard, the Court stated:
As the test [in Dagenais] is intended to “reflec[t] the substance of the Oakes test”,
we cannot require that Charter rights be the only legitimate objective of such
orders any more than we require that government action or legislation in violation
of the Charter be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another Charter right ...
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O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 129.
Hogg, supra, note 70, at 22-26-27.
Trinity Western, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, at para. 29.
Sierra Club, supra, note 73, at para. 38.
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... For cases where concerns about the proper administration of justice other than
those two [competing] Charter rights are raised, the ... broader approach will allow
those concerns to be weighed as well. There may also be other cases which raise
interests other than the administration of justice, for which a similar approach
would be used, depending of course on the particular danger at issue and rights and
interests at stake.80
(emphasis added).

In situations where the Dagenais framework is indeed modified to take into
account other interests (such as in Mentuck), the analysis required is more
holistic and approximates a section 1 analysis to some extent. This is because a
court is not simply striving to reconcile one individual’s Charter right with that
of another. Rather, it is seeking to reconcile the Charter rights in a manner that
adequately addresses other, and oftentimes broader, social purposes.

V. WHY IS IT SIGNIFICANT FOR COURTS TO ENGAGE IN THE
PROCESS OF RIGHTS RECONCILIATION?
1. To Facilitate Dialogue Between the Legislature and the Courts
In O’Connor, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of when accused persons should have access to the private records of complainants and witnesses.
Approximately 17 months after this decision, Parliament proclaimed into force
Bill C-46, which amended the Criminal Code in response to O’Connor. As
noted, elements of the Bill diverged considerably from the regime that was set
out by the Supreme Court in O’Connor. In Mills, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Bill C-46 notwithstanding these differences. The Court in
Mills emphasized:
... it is important to keep in mind that the decision in O’Connor is not necessarily
the last word on the subject. The law develops through dialogue between courts and
legislatures. Against the backdrop of O’Connor, Parliament was free to craft its
own solution to the problem consistent with the Charter.81

This dialogue was discussed by the Supreme Court in Vriend v. Alberta:82
To my mind, a great value of judicial review and this dialogue among the
branches is that each of the branches is made somewhat accountable to the other.
The work of the legislature is reviewed by the courts and the work of the court in
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Mentuck, supra, note 71, at paras. 31-33.
Mills, supra, note 69, at para. 20 (citation omitted).
82
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493. See also P.W. Hogg and A.A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75.
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its decisions can be reacted to by the legislature in the passing of new legislation
(or even overarching laws under s. 33 of the Charter). This dialogue between and
accountability of each of the branches have the effect of enhancing the democratic
process, not denying it.83

The O’Connor and the Mills cases provide the paradigm example of the
“dialogue” between the legislature and the judiciary:
Parliament has enacted this legislation after a long consultation process that included a consideration of the constitutional standards outlined by this Court in
O’Connor… While it is the role of the courts to specify such standards, there may
be a range of permissible regimes that can meet these standards. It goes without
saying that this range is not confined to the specific rule adopted by the Court pursuant to its competence in the common law. In the present case, Parliament decided
that legislation was necessary in order to address the issue of third party records
more comprehensively. As is evident from the language of the preamble to Bill C46, Parliament also sought to recognize the prevalence of sexual violence against
women and children and its disadvantageous impact on their rights, to encourage
the reporting of incidents of sexual violence, to recognize the impact of the production of personal information on the efficacy of treatment, and to reconcile fairness
to complainants with the rights of the accused ... It is perfectly reasonable that these
many concerns may lead to a procedure that is different from the common law position but that nonetheless meets the required constitutional standards.84

Rights reconciliation, therefore, is a vital exercise since it both invites and
facilitates dialogue between the legislative and judicial branches of government.
2. To Ensure that the Common Law Accords with Charter Values
In R.W.D.S.U., Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,85 the Supreme Court
drew a distinction between actually applying the Charter to the common law
and ensuring that the common law reflects Charter values. It underscored the
fact that care must be taken not to expand the application of the Charter beyond
the ambit established by section 32(1).86 Therefore, in the context of civil litigation involving private parties, the Charter will “apply” to the common law only

83

Id., at para. 139.
Mills, supra, note 69, at para. 59.
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[1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 [hereinafter “Dolphin Delivery”].
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Section 32.(1) of the Charter reads:
This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all
matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and (b) to the legislature and government of each province
in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.
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to the extent that it is found inconsistent with Charter values. In Dolphin Delivery, McIntyre J. stated:
Where such exercise of, or reliance upon, governmental action is present and where
one private party invokes or relies upon it to produce an infringement of the
Charter rights of another, the Charter will be applicable. Where, however, private
party “A” sues private party “B” relying on the common law and where no act of
government is relied upon to support the action, the Charter will not apply. I
should make it clear, however, that this is a distinct issue from the question whether
the judiciary ought to apply and develop the principles of the common law in a
manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution. The
answer to this question must be in the affirmative. In this sense, then, the Charter is
far from irrelevant to private litigants whose disputes fall to be decided at common
law. But this is different from the proposition that one private party owes a
constitutional duty to another, which proposition underlies the purported assertion
of Charter causes of action or Charter defences between individuals.87

Rights reconciliation is crucial to ensuring that the common law evolves in
accordance with, and is interpreted in light of, the Charter. In Ryan, the Supreme Court remarked:
In view of the purely private nature of the litigation at bar, the Charter does not
“apply” per se. Nevertheless, ensuring that the common law of privilege develops
in accordance with “Charter values” requires that the existing rules be scrutinized
to ensure that they reflect the values the Charter enshrines. This does not mean that
the rules of privilege can be abrogated entirely and replaced with a new form of
discretion governing disclosure. Rather, it means that the basic structure of the
common law privilege analysis must remain intact, even if particular rules which
are applied within that structure must be modified and updated to reflect emerging
social realities.88
(emphasis added).

In some cases, the common law will provide sufficient protection for all the
Charter rights in question. In Hill,89 for instance, the Supreme Court concluded
that the common law of defamation represented an adequate compromise between the twin values of freedom of expression and reputation (which are
closely linked with the right to privacy).
In other cases, however, the common law will not have struck the appropriate relationship between competing Charter rights and courts will be required to
modify the common law accordingly. Thus, in Dagenais, the Supreme Court
found it necessary to “reformulate the common law rule governing the issuance
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Dolphin Delivery, supra, note 85, at 602-603.
Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, at para. 23.
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130.
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of publication bans in a manner that reflect[ed] the principles of the Charter.” 90
Whatever the ultimate conclusion, the exercise of reviewing and scrutinizing
the common law with reference to the Charter is an important and valuable one.

VI. CONCLUSION
It is possible to envisage a series of situations where Charter rights seemingly overlap or conflict. Several such scenarios have already been addressed
by the Supreme Court; others will work their way through the court system
over time. The idea of “rights reconciliation” is thus emerging as a relatively
new and developing area of Charter interpretation. Many of the cases involving
rights reconciliation will be challenging, requiring courts to reconcile individual freedoms perceived as central to how we define ourselves as a society —
freedom of expression; freedom of religion; life, liberty and security of person,
and so on. There is no mechanistic rule that can be applied to yield a definitive
answer to the pressing question: What should courts do when Charter rights
conflict? Rather, courts must be acutely sensitive to context and approach the
Charter analysis flexibly, and with a view to giving fullest possible expression
to all the rights involved. Put another way, like many other important issues of
Charter interpretation, the last word has not been written, but I believe a helpful
beginning has been established.
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Dagenais, supra, note 72, at 878.
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